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We distinguish two general approaches to inner speech (IS)—the “format” and the
“activity” views—and defend the activity view. The format view grounds the utility of
IS on features of the representational format of language, and is related to the thesis
that the proper function of IS is to make conscious thinking possible. IS appears typically
as a product constituted by representations of phonological features. The view also has
implications for the idea that passivity phenomena in cognition may be misattributed IS.
The activity view sees IS as a speaking activity that does not have a proper function
in cognition. It simply inherits the array of functions of outer speech. We argue that
it is methodologically advisable to start from this variety of uses, which suggests
commonalities between internal and external activities. The format view has several
problems; it has to deny “unsymbolized thinking”; it cannot easily explain how IS makes
thoughts available to consciousness, and it cannot explain those uses of IS where its
format features apparently play no role. The activity view not only lacks these problems
but also has explanatory advantages: construing IS as an activity allows it to be integrally
constituted by its content; the view is able to construe unsymbolized thinking as part of
a continuum of phenomena that exploit the same mechanisms, and it offers a simple
explanation for the variety of uses of IS.
Keywords: inner speech, format view, activity view, consciousness, unsymbolized thinking, phonological
representation, action prediction
INTRODUCTION
Inner speech (IS) is typically characterized as the experience of
silently talking to oneself. It is reported as phenomenologically
different from other experiences such as visual images, emo-
tions, or the controversial phenomenon of unsymbolized thought
(Hurlburt and Akhter, 2008). In this paper we distinguish two
general approaches to IS—what we will call the “format” and
the “activity” views. These approaches hold different theses about
what elements are more relevant to characterize the phenomenon.
As we will see, the format view regards IS chiefly as a certain
product with certain format features, whereas the activity view
emphasizes its properties as an activity. These may appear as mere
differences in emphasis—after all, the format view may readily
accept that IS is an activity and the activity view does not deny
that there is a format involved. Yet the reason for their respective
emphases lies in the fact that they have distinct commitments to
what is central of the phenomenon. In particular, we will see that
the two approaches have different views concerning the cognitive
functions of IS, especially whether IS is or is not necessary for
conscious thinking.
These are, in general, philosophical approaches, yet empirically
well-informed ones. We are aware that, on the one hand, as a
verbal phenomenon, a good account of IS will ultimately depend
on precise models of linguistic production and comprehension;
and that, on the other hand, as a cognitive phenomenon, a
plausible account of IS requires more data than we presently have.
However, it is useful to bring to the light the commitments and
consequences of holding a certain general view of what IS actually
is. In particular, it helps for the methodological assessment of
what aspects of the phenomenon it is worthwhile to investigate.
In this paper we spell out the differences between the format and
activity views, and defend the advantages of the latter.
THE FORMAT VIEW OF INNER SPEECH
The format view is attributable to most authors who have written
about the functions of IS in the last two decades1. In its strongest
form,2 it can be characterized by the following three theses:
(i) the strong consciousness thesis: IS is necessary for conscious
thinking;
(ii) the format thesis: in IS we recruit a representational system
because of its features as a format;
(iii) the product thesis: IS consists in some output of the lin-
guistic production system, typically strings of phonological
representations.
The first thesis is about the role of IS. If “thinking” is roughly
understood as any cognitive event that involves the manipulation
1Exceptions are Vygotskyans like Fernyhough (2009) and Hurlburt et al.
(2013).
2Along the paper we will introduce a number of weaker versions of the view,
which relax one or more theses so as to answer a particular challenge.
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or tokening of propositional contents, the thesis says that doing
any of this consciously requires the presence of IS. The second
thesis is about the nature of IS. It says that what is essential for
something to count as IS is that it is formatted in a certain way.
The third thesis provides a further specification of the kinds of
representations involved in IS.
The first and second theses are two sides of the same coin:
it is claimed that in IS we recruit a format with certain fea-
tures because those features open the possibility to have con-
scious thoughts3 at all. Different authors have focused on differ-
ent features, such as digitality, or context-independence (Clark,
1998), perceptuality and introspectability (Jackendoff, 1996, 2012;
Prinz, 2011, 2012; Bermúdez, 2003), and predicative structure
(Bermúdez, 2003). To take one example: Jackendoff, and Prinz
following him, holds that “pure” conscious thinking is impossible
for architectural reasons: we can be conscious of intermediate
level representations (like 2.5D representations in the visual sys-
tem), but never of basic-level or higher-level representations,
such as concepts or spatial 3D representations. Thus, if we want
to have conscious thoughts, we have to use a representational
format that has the right kind of representations. Images are
good, but phonological representations are much better, given
that phonological representations can vehicle many more kinds of
thoughts (about the future or past, about abstracta and possibilia,
about relations, etc.).
These considerations lead Jackendoff to the product thesis, i.e.,
that IS is constituted by strings of phonological representations or
structures4. One may wonder, however, how central the product
thesis is for the format view, and how specific its commitment to
a certain type of product is. With respect to centrality, one may
contend that the view does not need to regard IS as constituted
solely by phonological representations5. Surely IS appears as a
content-carrying format so it is also constituted by a semantic
component. Moreover, the general approach can also be formu-
lated in a way that is compatible with the idea that IS is an action:
the action of producing strings of inner linguistic items (mainly)
with the purpose of bringing our thoughts to consciousness. In
fact, sometimes Carruthers (2011) comes close to presenting IS
in this way, so depicting him as endorsing the format view can
seem contentious. The difference between this view and what we
3As the notion of thought has different uses in the literature, let us spell out
the properties that matter for this paper:
(i) A thought is a mental state with propositional content.
(ii) It can be individuated from other thoughts in terms of its content.
(iii) It can be unconscious or conscious, so it is possible to have the same
thought in both modalities.
A conscious thought, thus, is a conscious mental state with propositional
content, for instance, a conscious judgment that p.
Finally, even if “having a thought” and “thinking a thought” could point
toward passive/active occurrences of thought, this is a distinction that we do
not discuss in this paper so we will use both expressions interchangeably.
4See, e.g.: “[Chomsky] has fallen into the trap (. . .) of believing that inner
speech is thought, rather than (as I will argue) the phonological structure
corresponding to thought” (Jackendoff, 2007, p. 70), and “conscious thought
gets its form (. . .) from the inner voice, the verbal images of pronunciation”
(Jackendoff, 2012, p. 103).
5We owe this objection to a referee.
will call the activity view would perhaps appear as a matter of
emphasis and degree.
However, Carruthers (2014), as Jackendoff, Prinz, or
Bermúdez, does put the focus on the product and its properties6.
It has to be noted, on the other hand, that many authors who
are not particularly concerned with the issue of the role of IS in
conscious thinking, also take IS to be a product (Pickering and
Garrod, 2013). That is, it seems to be customary to think of IS
as a product and not as an activity of some kind. With respect to
the commitment to a specific kind of product, one may observe
that there are different kinds of phonological representations.
We can distinguish at least articulatory, phonemic, and acoustic
phonological representations. We may think that the activity of
inner speaking makes use of all three kinds of representations.
However, does IS consist in all of them? If IS is characterized in
product terms, it seems that IS has to be strings of phonological
acoustic representations. There are two reasons to support this
claim. Firstly, if the format has to be introspectable/perceptual,
it seems that only acoustic representations can do the trick,
given that neither articulatory nor phonemic representations are
introspectable according to his account (see above). So, following
Jackendoff, Prinz states that speech sounds, where he includes
silent speech, “are experienced at a level that lies above the
buzzing confusion of unfiltered sound waves but below the level
of phoneme categories” (Prinz, 2012, p. 69).
Secondly, some authors believe that IS as a product makes
thoughts conscious because IS is a prediction issued on the basis
of an afterward aborted motor action (see Carruthers, 2011; Pick-
ering and Garrod, 2013). Subjects give instructions to produce a
certain linguistic item; these instructions are converted into motor
commands; and then the command is aborted, but not before an
efference copy is sent to the forward models, which issue a pre-
diction about the sensory incoming signal corresponding to the
aborted motor command. If this is what IS ultimately consists in,
i.e., the prediction of an incoming sensory signal, then, arguably,
an instance of IS has to be an acoustic representation, since the
prediction represents sounds (not phonemes or articulations).
Be it as it may, we are ready to accept that the association
between the strong consciousness and the format theses is more
central for the format view than the product thesis, and that any
commitments to a certain kind of product typically arise as a
consequence of endorsing the two former theses. Indeed, it is only
by relaxing these theses that a defender of the format view will be
able to deal with some of the challenges for that view that we are
going to present.
PROBLEMS FOR THE FORMAT VIEW
We want to present three general problems we see related to the
format view—general in the sense that they stem from endorsing
its theses (i) and (ii) (strong consciousness and format). First, it
has to deny the phenomenon of “unsymbolized thinking” (UT;
Hurlburt and Akhter, 2008). Second, it cannot easily explain how
6“Especially important (. . .) are the auditory images that result from off-
line activation of instructions for producing speech, which result in auditory
representations of the speech act that would normally result, in so-called
‘inner speech”’ (Carruthers, 2014, p. 149).
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IS makes thought-contents available to consciousness (Jorba and
Vicente, 2014). Third, it may have problems in accounting for the
variability of uses of IS. In addition to these general problems, we
will finally examine a particular rendering of the IS-as-a-product
idea, namely, the suggestion that IS is an acoustic representation
that predicts an incoming sensory signal—a suggestion that has
some problems of its own.
THE PUZZLE OF UNSYMBOLIZED THINKING
Using the method of Descriptive Experience Sampling, Heavey
and Hurlburt (2008) reported that people claimed to experience
inner episodes in which they had the feeling of “thinking a par-
ticular, definite thought without the awareness of that thought’s
being conveyed in words, images, or any other symbols” (p. 802).
For instance, someone could report her experience as wondering
whether a friend would be driving his car or his truck but with no
words carrying this specific content, and no images of the friend,
the car or the truck (Hurlburt and Akhter, 2008, p. 1364). Accord-
ing to their results this kind of “unsymbolized thinking” occupies
around an average of 22% of our conscious life (Hurlburt and
Akhter, 2008; Hurlburt et al., 2013).
Unsymbolized thinking is not an uncontroversial phe-
nomenon. Even though there are other strands of research that
point toward a distinctive phenomenology for propositional
thought (Siewert, 1998; Pitt, 2004), its characterization is elusive.
For instance, Hurlburt and Akhter (2008) portray it mostly in a
negative way, holding that “unsymbolized thinking is experienced
to be a thinking, not a feeling, not an intention, not an intimation,
not a kinesthetic event, not a bodily event” (p. 1366). In this paper
we do not wish to enter the debate concerning the evidence for
UT. Rather, the point we want to make is conditional: if UT is a
genuine phenomenon to explain, it poses a serious problem for
the format view. This view claims that we recruit IS so that we
can have conscious thoughts—otherwise, we would not be able to
think consciously. But if it is possible to have conscious thoughts
without the presence of IS then the format view’s claim is simply
false. Indeed, its best strategy is simply to deny this phenomenon.
In this vein, Carruthers (2009) argues that UT may be a result of
confabulation: people report thinking without words or images,
but they may be actually using words and/or images, or they may
not be really thinking (e.g., they think that they were thinking
about what product to buy, but in fact they were only looking at
the different products). Hurlburt et al. (2013), in contrast, suggest
that confabulation probably goes the other way around: we engage
in more UT than that 22% average, but as we tend to identify
thinking with innerly speaking, we tend to report using words
when in fact we are not using them.
To repeat, any view that endorses both the strong conscious-
ness and the format theses will hold that, in fact, IS is the form
that conscious propositional thinking adopts7, so inasmuch as UT
is propositional it is simply impossible. However, it is possible to
construe weaker versions of the format view in which UT appears
as a more tractable phenomenon. In particular, one may drop the
7See, e.g., Bermúdez (2003, pp. 159–160): “[A]ll the propositional thoughts
that we consciously introspect (. . .) take the form of sentences in a public
language” (his emphasis).
strong consciousness thesis and hold that IS is not necessary to
have conscious thoughts. IS would be only a good way, possibly
the best, to make thoughts conscious, but there are other ways
to do so. Perceptual theories of consciousness (Prinz, 2011) are
a good candidate for this weaker version. These theories claim
that a thought always needs a certain perceptual format in order
to be conscious, and that “even high-level perceptual states and
motor commands are inaccessible to consciousness” (Prinz, 2011,
p. 174). IS constitutes a variety of such a perceptual format but
there could be others. In particular, there could be non-symbolic
perceptual vehicles, like emotions, or bodily feelings. Following
this path, there is a chance to account for UT without denying the
phenomenon: an unsymbolized thought would be a thought that
is cashed-out in some non-symbolic perceptual format.
There are problems for such an account. A first problem is
that it is not clear that it actually fits the characterization of the
phenomenon offered by researchers of the phenomenon. Recall
that Hurlburt and Akhter (2008) reject that UT is experienced
as a feeling, intention, intimation, kinesthetic or bodily event,
adding that people “confidently discriminate between experiences
that are thoughts (. . .) and experiences that are feelings (. . .)
or sensory awareness” (p. 1366). This seems to leave very little
room to manoeuver for a perceptual account of UT. Now, one
may protest that Hurlburt and Akhter’s (2008) positive character-
ization of the phenomenon is somewhat wanting and that there
is perhaps a different kind of perception behind it. So let us
focus on a second problem that seems to be more pressing for
the perceptual account, namely, the problem of accounting for
the specific semantic content of the unsymbolized thoughts that
subjects report.
If UT is a genuine phenomenon the only positive characteri-
zation we have is that subjects claim to be experiencing definite
thoughts8. So any account of the phenomenon will have to
respect this characterization. Consider the unsymbolized won-
dering whether a friend would be driving his car or his truck.
What sort of perceptual experiences could carry that content?
If the subject were engaged in an experience of IS the answer
would be straightforward: it is the content of a mental sentence.
But non-symbolic perceptual experiences, such as certain feelings
associated to your friend and his truck, appear as unsuitable for
that task. Certainly, in Prinz’s view (e.g., in his theory of emotions,
Prinz, 2004) feelings can have intentional contents, but they do
not seem to be so nuanced to include the specific content of
a thought such as the subject’s wondering. Prinz’s suggestion
of treating propositional attitudes in terms alike to emotions
(Prinz, 2011) can help with respect to the “attitude” part, i.e., it
might be the case that what distinguishes “wondering whether
8A referee points out that Vygotsky’s distinction between a natural and a
cultural line of development is relevant to the question of UT. Those two path-
ways to thought could result in kinds of thinking with different properties, and
UT could occur in both of them, so its analysis would have to take into account
the distinction. We agree that this might be the case and insist that a definite
characterization of UT is still lacking. In this paper we will limit ourselves
to the minimal characterization offered by Hurlburt et al. (2013)—i.e., UT
as thought with propositional content and a “proprietary” phenomenological
basis—and we sketch a proposal that would link it to the cultural line—see
Section “The Relation Between Inner Speech and Unsymbolized Thinking.”
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p” from “doubting that p” is a certain emotion-like feeling that
accompanies the thought. Yet this feeling does not account for
the experience of the content p, so something else must back
the latter experience. Given the problems of attaching specific
propositional contents to visual or other non-verbal sensory
elements (more on this in the next section), Prinz does not seem
to have other resources than imaged sentences. Therefore UT
appears for him as unlikely as for other defenders of the format
view.
Perhaps a way out of this problem is to claim that the non-
symbolic perceptual format is recruited, but not to broadcast
thought-contents, but to prompt them. That is, perceptual expe-
riences would not be used as vehicles of the content but only as
means to focus our attention or to keep track of our thought pro-
cesses. Conscious thinking may thus be unsymbolic in Hurlburt’s
sense, even though many times unsymbolic conscious thinking
uses perceptual scaffolding. Yet, this alternative view seems full of
problems.
The format view provides an account of how IS is generated,
and tries to explain how IS makes conscious thinking possible.
Yet it has no explanation about conscious thinking which is not
supported by IS—the prompting model appears as an ad hoc
addition to it. If we take Carruthers’s model as a paradigm of the
format view (see below), it is clear that the model is not made
to explain that IS prompts conscious thoughts, but to explain that
IS vehicles conscious thoughts. Producing a string of phonolog-
ical representations with contents attached is having a thought,
according to the model, whereas the prompting model would say
that producing a perceptual surrogate—verbal or otherwise—just
facilitates having a thought in consciousness, the relation between
the prompt and the content being arbitrary.
Finally, the format view also seems to account for the sense
of agency related to mental phenomena inasmuch as it construes
them as motor phenomena. For instance, in Carruthers’s model
agent awareness is explained on the basis of the production of
imagery that engages the forward model system. The details of
how the sense of agency emerges are not clear9, yet it seems
that the prompting model cannot explain why prompted thinking
would feel as our own thinking. The only thing that one would feel
as his own would be the prompt.
HOW THOUGHT-CONTENTS ARE AVAILABLE TO CONSCIOUSNESS
Even if one disputes the evidence for UT, the format view still
has the problem of explaining how thought-contents are available
to consciousness (see Jorba and Vicente, 2014, for extended
discussion). Any account of conscious thinking has to explain
how thought-contents become access-conscious10. Defenders of
the format view hold that by producing strings of phonological
9As we will see in Section “The Relation Between Inner Speech and Unsym-
bolized Thinking,” the view that IS is an incoming sensory signal seems to fare
better in this respect, for it involves comparisons, which many regard essential
to the generation of self-attribution (see Frith, 2012).
10As it is well known, the distinction between phenomenal and access con-
sciousness was first introduced by Block (1995). Phenomenal consciousness is
defined in terms of what-it-is-likeness or experience, and Access consciousness
is characterized as information being available to the direct rational control of
thought and action.
representations we bring thought-contents to consciousness. Yet,
it is not explained how this is done. It seems that by speaking to
ourselves we become conscious of the phonological structure of
our IS. How does this kind of consciousness explain consciousness
of meanings, or contents? Remember that, on some accounts, like
Jackendoff ’s, conceptual structures and therefore meanings and
propositional contents, are necessarily unconscious. The question
then is: how do these structures or representations become con-
scious, at least, access-conscious, by virtue of making phonologi-
cal structures conscious?
Clark (1998), as well as Bermúdez (2003) and Jackendoff
(1996, 2012) propose that phonological representations convert
propositional contents into objects that become present to the
mind’s eye. However, it seems that converting a propositional
content into an object one can “look at” only enables subjects
to know what they are thinking, not to think those thoughts
consciously. Instead of making them aware of a certain propo-
sitional content p, and so to consciously believe or judge that
p, this mechanism makes them aware that they are thinking that
propositional content, i.e., that they are believing or judging that
p. Objectifying seems to give the subject metarepresentation, but
not ground-level conscious thinking.
Let us clarify this point in terms of Clark’s position. Clark
(1998) presents his view as a development of Vygotsky’s ideas
about IS Vygotsky (1987). However, the role he envisions for
IS is very different from Vygotsky’s emphasis on the role of IS
in self-regulation and executive on-line control, as well as in
planning more or less immediate actions—that is, not planning a
summer trip, but planning how to solve the Tower of Hanoi task.
Vygotskyans typically hold that IS helps us focus our attention
on what we are doing, whereas Clark et al. hold that it makes
possible for us to focus on what we are thinking. Vygotskyans
point out that IS is involved in, inter alia, executing an action step
by step. This means that IS enables us to do whatever we are doing
in a conscious mode. We monitor our behavior by consciously
thinking “this goes here,” “this goes there,” “if this goes here, then
that goes there,” etc. In contrast, Clark’s model is a model not of
behavior control or monitoring, but apparently of metacognition,
i.e., of knowing what we think. We believe there is a difference
between saying that IS helps us to have conscious thoughts, which
are used to monitor and control our behavior, and holding that
IS makes us aware of what we are thinking, so that we are able to
think about our thinking.
Perhaps Clark, Jackendoff and Bermúdez do not intend their
account to have the narrow scope we are ascribing to it11. How-
ever, the model they propose seems to only be able to explain
11However, see Clark (1998, p. 171): “[P]ublic language (. . .) is responsible for
a complex of rather distinctive features of human thought viz, our ability to
display second order cognitive dynamics. By second order cognitive dynamics I
mean a cluster of powerful capacities involving self-evaluation, self-criticism
and finely honed remedial responses (. . .) This thinking about thinking, is
a good candidate for a distinctively human capacity (. . .) Jackendoff (. . .)
suggests that the mental rehearsal of sentences may be the primary means
by which our own thoughts are able to become objects of further attention
and reflection.” See also Bermúdez (2003, p. 163): “We think about thoughts
through thinking about the sentences through which those thoughts might be
expressed.”
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how IS gives us knowledge of what and how we think. Let’s say
that by using sentences of our language, we are able to have some
kind of object before our minds. What do we gain with that?
Presumably, we only gain knowledge about what we are thinking.
We “see” the sentence, get its meaning, and reach the conclusion
“ok, I’m thinking that p.” This knowledge about what and how
we are thinking may be very useful, of course, but we would say
that this is only a use of IS, among many others12. The account, in
any case, does not explain how thought-contents are made access-
conscious.
In this respect, Carruther’s (2011, 2014) idea that thought-
contents are bound into strings of phonological representations
and broadcast along with them fares much better. For accord-
ing to this idea, thought-contents as such make it into access-
consciousness by being bound to formats which are both phe-
nomenal and access-conscious: “there is every reason to think that
conceptual information that is activated by interactions between
mid-level areas and the association areas (. . .) gets bound into the
content of attended perceptual states and is broadcast along with
the latter. Hence we don’t just see a spherical object moving along
a surface, but a tomato rolling toward the edge of the counter top;
and we don’t just hear a sequence of phonemes when someone
speaks, but we hear what they are saying; and so on” (Carruthers,
2014, p. 148).
What is not clear in this view is how the binding process takes
place, especially given that, according to Carruthers, what we do
in order to extract the meaning of an IS episode is to interpret
an already conscious phonological representation by means of
the usual comprehension mechanisms. According to Langland-
Hassan (2014), however, the only content that can be bound into
an episode of IS is of the kind: the semantic meaning of this
episode of IS is such and so. That is, the content bound into the
string of IS would not be about the world, as it should be, but
about the very string13. The reason is, basically, that phonolog-
ical representations represent acoustic properties, while semantic
representations represent the world. Langland-Hassan argues that
there is no way to fit these different kinds of representations into
a single item.
There are perhaps reasons to resist this idea. If one regards
representational content as the information that a representation
conveys, it is clear that a representational instance can convey
different kinds of information. A phonological representation
may represent sounds but it is by means of this acoustic infor-
mation that it also represents certain semantic information. That
is, in a nutshell, Prinz’s position (Prinz, 2011, 2012). Prinz argues
that consciousness requires attention to sensory representations.
These representations are “images generated from stored concepts
[that] inherit semantic properties from those concepts” (Prinz,
12On the other hand, second-order dynamics and metacognition are probably
different phenomena. We can know what we are thinking just by having
conscious thoughts: once you think a thought consciously, you also know that
you are having that thought. In this respect, thinking is similar to perceiving:
when you have a conscious perceptual experience, you thereby also know that
you are having that experience. What objectification gives us, we would say, is
the ability to reflect about our thinking and to gain control over our higher-
level cognitive processes.
13In philosophical jargon, the content would be token-reflexive.
2011, p. 182). IS constitutes a particularly important kind of
images, i.e., linguistic images, which carry information both about
acoustic properties and semantic content. In this respect, Prinz’s
theory seems to eschew Langland-Hassan’s criticism: causal-
informational chains are responsible of keeping the different sorts
of information attached to the same sensory representation, so the
binding problem may not arise.
However, Langland-Hassan’s analysis also raises another con-
cern: those different contents have different functional or inferen-
tial roles to play. Acoustic information will play a role in inferences
having to do with the representation’s sound, while semantic
information will be routinely exploited for reasoning processes
having to do with what those words mean. Those inferential roles
cannot simply be mixed together. Again, Prinz’s view may have
a way out of this difficulty: those contents are not attended at
the same time. To have conscious thoughts, a subject must have
a certain sensory representation in mind and attend to it, but
nothing precludes that at some times she attends to its sensory
properties, and others to its semantic content. So thoughts are
available to consciousness simply by attending to the sensory
elements related to the semantic representation proper.
We think there is a problem in this position. Compare the
case in which a subject is attending to the representation’s sensory
information with the case in which she is attending to its semantic
information. What is the phenomenological difference between
both cases in the subject’s mind? According to Prinz’s perceptual
consciousness account, there must be some sensory difference
between them, e.g., an accompanying sensory representation.
So if the subject is thinking about the representation’s acoustic
information some acoustic-related representation will be present;
if she is thinking about its semantic information, some semantic-
related representation will be present.
This account paves the way to an infinite regress. Notice that
accompanying representations have to be sensory representations
themselves, and the same sort of question can be raised with
respect to them: does the subject attend to its sensory or to its
semantic information? To distinguish between both cases one
must appeal to further distinct accompanying representations,
which are sensory representations themselves and which raise the
same kind of issue. To put the problem in different terms: if you
have a theory in which for a thought to be conscious it must be
cashed out in a certain format, then you introduce a gap between
the thought’s content and the content of the format itself. What
makes the thought conscious cannot be simply the format because
there is always the question of how that particular format makes
that particular thought conscious.
THE VARIOUS FUNCTIONS OF INNER SPEECH
The final problem for the format view we want to mention is
that it is not clear how it can account for the variability of
uses and of kinds of IS. We use IS in most of the kind of
situations where we may use outer, or overt, speech (OS). For
instance, IS is used for motivating, encouraging, entertaining,
expressing the speaker’s emotions or feels, guiding behavior,
etc. The main difference is simply that OS can be addressed
to someone else whereas IS has to be addressed to oneself. So
among the functions of OS that we probably would not find in
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normal IS we can count those actions that conceptually require
somebody else, like promising and threatening, perhaps—yet
IS can include comparable functions, such as warnings. At any
rate, this is just a reflection of how the things one can do with
language depend on the audience one is addressing but this
reveals no important, or deep, functional difference between outer
and IS.
When it comes to explaining the plurality of functions of IS,
the format view may have a problem. The format view is not
committed to claiming that we only use IS for having conscious
thoughts. However, apparently, it does propose a story about why
IS is recruited and thus seems to commit to a certain idea about
the proper function of IS: the proper function of IS would be to
make conscious thinking possible, while uses of IS not related to
conscious thinking would be derivative. Yet it is difficult to see
how such derivation would proceed. For instance, if one consid-
ers the case of OS, one cannot find an analogous fundamental
function. One might appeal to the notion of “communication,”
arguing that it is akin to the very general function of “focusing
someone else’s attention on something,” or “making someone
conscious of something.” Yet this is at most a loose way of
speaking.
Let us flesh out a general motivation that lends support to the
thesis that IS may have a proper, constitutive, function. There is
this old conundrum about why someone ought to talk to herself,
when she knows in advance what she is going to say. In other
words, if one thinks that the semantic content is “already there”
before the words are actually uttered, one should not bother to
put it in words for oneself. In other words, IS cannot have a
communicative function because communication presupposes an
informational mismatch between the speaker and the listener,
and this mismatch does not exist when both roles concur in
the same person. Second, it is not clear that some uses of IS
count as communication. For instance, it does not seem to be
necessary to characterize self-motivation, or even self-evaluation
or self-awareness (Morin, 2011), in terms of communication. It is
weird to say that when you motivate yourself with words you are
engaging in some act of communication with yourself. If IS does
not have a communicative function it must have a function of its
own. Which one? A promising response seems to be that IS has a
function related to conscious thinking.
Even though this is an alluring motivation, we think it has a
basic flaw: it seems to assume that the function of outer speech
is merely communicative. However, this is not the case. OS can
play the same cognitive roles as IS, including the alleged roles
related to consciousness. When the mother, helping her daughter
to solve a jigsaw puzzle, tells her “this here. . . that there,” etc., she
is directing her attention to the items and the places, i.e., she is
regulating her behavior by talking, just as we are supposed to be
doing when we use IS. In principle, anything that we tell in IS
could be told in OS, and for exactly the same purposes. So if IS
had the function of making thought-contents conscious, it would
certainly not be its proper function but a function of speech in
general (e.g., in the case considered, we can say that the mother is
making her daughter conscious of where the different pieces go, so
that the daughter consciously judges that this piece goes here, etc.,
thus gaining control over the resolution of the puzzle). IS would
not have the communicative function of OS but IS’s functions
could still be considered as a subset of OS’s.
However, this “proper function” commitment may be not
essential to the view. It is relatively easy to read authors as
endorsing claims about the proper functions of IS—many state-
ments take the form of “we use IS for x,” where x is substituted
by conscious thinking, system-2 thinking (Frankish, 2010), self-
regulation, executive control, or whatever. Yet, it may be non-
charitable to read these claims as expressing strong views about
proper functions. A more liberal reading is to think that each
author has focused on a use of IS and has simply apparently
left the rest in the background. We think it is methodologically
advisable to start by first detailing the different uses of IS, the
different situations where we use it, as well as the different kinds
of IS that there may be, but this is a different issue (for examples
of this kind of approach, see Morin et al., 2011; Hurlburt et al.,
2013). The point now is that defenders of the format view may
drop a strong commitment to a proper function of IS and accept
a plurality of uses.
However, even if the “proper function” commitment is aban-
doned, we think that when it comes to account for the uses of IS
the format view typically has the order of explanation backward.
The story assumes that IS couches thoughts in a certain format,
and that, by doing so, those thoughts can be put to new, different
uses. Yet the functional order is just the opposite: thoughts are
formed and recruited to be put to different uses and, in doing
so, they can appear in a certain format. Consider the example
of an athlete telling herself motivating words (Hatzigeorgiadis
et al., 2011). The athlete does not first form the mental sentence
“you can do it” and then use this sentence to motivate herself.
Rather, the athlete is engaged in the activity of motivating herself
and, in doing so, her motivating thoughts can reach the point in
which she hears herself telling encouraging words silently (or even
aloud sometimes). Or consider the case of someone deciding to
put more money in the parking meter and telling himself “One
more quarter? Mmm. . . Can be back in one hour. Better a coffee.”
The subject is making a decision by means of certain conceptual
activity. Some of the elements of this activity—typically the most
salient and relevant ones—can emerge to consciousness under
verbal control, where they can be put to further uses and lead
to new cycles of mental activity. These two examples are cases in
which the linguistic production system may be recruited spon-
taneously so that, so to speak, “words come to our mind” but,
of course, we can also bring words to our minds by engaging
explicitly in linguistic activity. The student preparing a talk may
revise innerly some of the sentences she intends to utter, so as to
change a few words, decide where to put the emphasis, and the
like. Again, the way of describing this is not that she is putting her
thoughts in verbal format and then examining them. Rather, she
is already engaged in the activity of examining her own thoughts
on the matter she wishes to talk about and uses her verbal systems
so as to do this in a more precise manner.
On the other hand, endorsement of the format view involves
that, even if one abandons the idea of a proper function, one
still holds the claim that recruiting a format plays a necessary
role in the plurality of functions. Yet some of those functions
cast doubts concerning the claim that the format is necessary—let
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alone the linguistic format. Think again about IS and motivation,
which is amply discussed in the psychology of sports literature
(Hatzigeorgiadis et al., 2011). An athlete does not need any kind
of particular format to motivate herself: she may tell herself “give
it all!!,” but she could just as well fix her sight at the finish line and
see how close it is, feel how fast her legs are moving, or whatever.
She needs perceptual or proprioceptive stimuli, but these do not
have to be self-produced (i.e., they do not have to be the result of
imagery or IS production).
Finally, the idea that in IS we always recruit a format for a
purpose is also open to doubt. There seem to be cases where the
only thing we do with IS is add a clearly unnecessary expressive
commentary to something that we have done (Hurlburt et al.,
2013), like the ‘a-ha’s, or ‘great!’s we tell ourselves after, for
instance, having thought hard about something. Would we say
that, in these cases, we are recruiting a format with some purpose?
Arguably, we would not put it in that way. Moreover, we would
probably say that we are using IS with no purpose at all—at
least no purpose related to the cognitive activity in question.
Yet, non-purposive IS seems to be a problem for the format
view however weakly it is construed, for the format view wants
that phonological representations are used to perform cognitive
functions.
IS INNER SPEECH A PREDICTION?
In this last section about the problems of the format view we want
to consider briefly the particular proposal about IS we have men-
tioned above, namely, that it is a prediction about the linguistic
sounds that one would hear if a certain linguistic action had not
been aborted. This proposal has some independent appeal, as it
construes IS as a species of motor imagery (Carruthers, 2011,
2014). Current theories of motor imagery (Jeannerod, 2006) hold
that motor imagery results from aborting the execution of motor
commands, and from generating a prediction about sensory and
proprioceptive incoming signals. It is appealing, we think, to
embed IS in a larger theory about imagery production.
However, the proposal that an episode of IS is a predic-
tion about linguistic sounds does have some problems. One
first problem is that it cannot accommodate the intuitive idea
that IS is typically experienced as meaningful, e.g., when one is
engaged in conscious reasoning. This is in contrast with meaning-
ignoring instances of IS (e.g., when one repeats some linguistic
items mentally so as to memorize them—we will call these cases
“meaningless” for short). We would say that when we talk about
IS in contexts like the present one, we are only talking about
meaningful IS. However, the way the format view prefers to
individuate IS does not need semantics, meaning or content—
or if it has a role for semantics, it is a secondary one, ancillary
to the format’s properties. So both meaningful and meaningless
instances of a string of phonological representation could count
as the same type of IS.
The proposal also seems to have problems to deal with data
which apparently show that IS may contain errors which are rec-
ognized as such (Oppenheim, 2013), because, prima facie, a pre-
diction issued on the basis of an efference copy is not monitored;
rather, its proper function is monitoring production. A related,
and complicated problem, is that the proposal excludes the cur-
rently widely accepted idea that passivity phenomena in cognition
(auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) and thought insertion)
may derive from a misattribution of IS (e.g., Ford and Mathalon,
2004; McCarthy-Jones, 2012; see also Langland-Hassan, 2008, for
a revised version in terms of a filtering/attenuation deficit)14. This
latter idea seems to require that IS is an incoming signal against
which a prediction is compared, rather than this very prediction.
That is, misattribution (as error checking) is only possible when
there is comparison, which in turn requires a prediction and an
incoming sensory signal. If the only product we get from inner
speaking is a sensory/acoustic prediction, then it is mysterious
how we could self- or other-attribute it (see, however Vicente,
2014 for development and criticism of the idea that IS is an
incoming sensory signal). It seems that both error checking and
misattribution require that IS is not a prediction about linguistic
sounds issued by the forward models.
THE ACTIVITY VIEW OF INNER SPEECH
The view we want to argue for stresses the activity of innerly
speaking, instead of the format of IS. This view is not without
precedent. For instance, the emphasis on activity is a key ingredi-
ent in the Soviet school to which Vygotsky belongs (Kozulin, 1986;
Guerrero, 2005) and many contemporary Vygotskyans under-
stand language as activity-based (Carpendale et al., 2009) and IS
as an internalization of this activity. Other recent approaches that
characterize IS as preserving some feature of linguistic activity—
and not merely linguistic format—include Fernyhough (2009),
who conceives of language as inherently dialogical, or Hurlburt
et al. (2013), who commend the use of inner speaking to avoid
regarding IS as mere representational product.
In relation to the format view we depict in this paper, our idea
of an activity view of IS rejects both the format and the strong
consciousness theses associated to the former. With respect to the
format thesis, it claims that in IS we do not recruit a format, be
it perceptual, predicative, or whatever. At most, we could say that
we recruit a linguistic activity, though we think using the notion
of recruitment mischaracterizes the view: we do not properly
recruit the activity of speaking; we just speak, although innerly.
With respect to the consciousness thesis, the view denies that IS
is necessary for thinking consciously, or that IS is for thinking
consciously (i.e., that its proper function is conscious thinking).
Rather, the activity view adopts a pluralistic stand: IS has almost as
many functions, or uses, as we can discover in OS, none of which
should be singled out as its proper function.15.
If we observe our own IS we will see that, in effect, IS is put to
use in many different circumstances: self-expression, motivation,
14However, Langdon et al. (2009) dispute this claim on the basis of studies
with schizophrenic patients. Comparing their AVH and IS, they found no sim-
ilarities between their phenomenological characteristics—similarities which
arguably ought to be present if AVHs derive from IS.
15The continuity of function between inner and outer speech is a typical
assumption in those that understand IS as inheriting the functional roles of
the private speech from which it originates (see reviews in Berk, 1992; Winsler,
2009). Relations between inner and outer speech are also currently the focus
of attention of empirical research in terms of parallelisms and differences
in the linguistic subsystems responsible for their respective processing—e.g.,
the comprehension and production systems (Vigliocco and Hartsuiker, 2002;
Geva et al., 2011). Those topics exceed the purposes of this paper.
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evaluation, attention-focusing, self-entertainment, fixing infor-
mation in memory, preparing linguistic actions, commenting on
what we have done, accompanying our thoughts, etc.16. There
seems to be no deep difference between reasons why we talk
to ourselves and reasons why we talk to someone else: we talk
to express ourselves, to motivate others, to evaluate events or
subjects, to help people to find places, to regulate their behavior,
etc. Moreover, there seems to be no deep difference between the
way we talk to ourselves and the way we talk to someone else.
For instance, if we want to motivate our favorite athlete, we may
tell her “come on!,” “you’re the best!,” that is, the kinds of things
she may be telling herself. If we want to help someone to get to
a certain destination, we may use a map and tell him “you go
here, then there. Go straight this way, turn here,” etc. That is, we
insert linguistic fragments within the background provided by the
map, which is what we do when we mix mental maps and IS in
orientation.
There are also parallels between the cases in which IS and OS
appear in longer, more elaborate linguistic constructions vs. those
in which they appear condensed or fragmentary. For instance,
when we talk about ourselves, or about a certain person or event
that concerns us, we typically use full sentences, and elaborate a
narrative, just as we do when we get introspective about ourselves,
other people, or certain events. On the other hand, our speech
appears as condensed or fragmentary if we are regulating someone
else’s behavior on-line: the adult that helps his kid to complete
a jigsaw puzzle, tells him “this piece here. Square there? Sure?
Where is a triangle missing? No. Yes,” etc. As has been long
highlighted by Vygotskyans, IS, when put to this kind of use,
is equally typically condensed17. This suggests that using IS is,
basically, innerly speaking (see also Hurlburt et al., 2013).
The activity view we propose is in clear contrast with the
strongest versions of the format view, i.e., those which hold that
IS is for conscious thinking, and that IS is necessary for con-
scious thinking because we need a certain format to get thought
consciousness. However, in the discussion of the format view
we have considered weaker versions of it. A weak version of the
format view, for instance, could simply claim that we produce
phonological representations to better do a variety of things, from
conscious thinking to motivation. The activity view and this weak
version of the format view do not look that different in principle.
However, there are reasons to prefer to categorize IS as an
activity tout court rather than in terms of a format. First, label-
ing IS as an activity fits better the natural description of IS
as speaking, and not as producing phonological representations
(even if phonological representations are produced). Second, the
notion of activity underscores the functional continuity between
outer and IS in a more natural way than the format view. As we
explained, the format view typically begins by focusing on a func-
tion that is putatively exclusive to IS, i.e., thought consciousness.
16See Morin et al. (2011) for a study that taps the variety of functions of IS.
17Vygotsky (1987) and followers have typically been concerned with the use
of IS in self-regulation, as they have been particularly concerned with the
moment kids start internalizing not just speech but social life in general. Yet,
the on-line regulation of behavior is just one function of speech among many
others, and it seems that there is no reason why speech should be used only for
that purpose when it gets converted into IS.
The consequence is that it tells apart outer and IS—the former
is an instrument of communication, the latter of cognition. Even
if one relaxes the account to make it sensitive to the plurality of
uses of IS, it tends to consider these uses as solutions to particular
cognitive demands. The activity view, in contrast, regards them as
predictable effects of internalizing OS and its different functions.
Be it as it may, the view we want to propose deserves the
label “activity view” on further grounds, which mark a stronger
contrast with the format approach. We claim that IS, as speech
in general, is characterized as a kind of action, namely, an action
that consists in expressing thoughts. In philosophical parlance,
this means that IS is individuated in terms of the action it is, i.e.,
that it is distinguished from other mental phenomena attending
to what the person (or the person’s mind) is doing. This excludes
that IS should be individuated in terms of its product qualities,
e.g., its properties as a string of phonological representations.
The question of how to individuate IS is not a mere meta-
physical point but has important methodological consequences
about how one should approach its study or what sorts of mental
mechanisms are relevant for it. For instance, by laying the focus
on the action of speaking, it is quite natural to try to understand
IS in terms of all the representations that are mobilized in speech,
i.e., semantic, syntactic, maybe articulatory, etc. As we argued in
Section “How Thought-Contents are Available to Consciousness,”
in the format view the semantic properties of an instance of IS
appear as something that one has to bind to it—not as something
inherently constitutive of it—raising concerns about how the
binding takes place. In contrast, for the activity view the act of
innerly speaking begins with a prior intention to express a certain
thought that can get more and more specific, until it reaches the
level of motor commands. The representations involved in the
activity—from conceptual to phonological—form an integrated
system, and the ultimate format’s properties have no privileged
role in accounting for the phenomenon and its functions.
ADVANTAGES OF THE ACTIVITY VIEW
We hold that the activity view has several advantages over the
format view. In this section we will develop a particular proposal
about how the activity view can explain certain phenomena.
The activity view, as we have presented it, is rather liberal in its
commitments. Thus, it is compatible with what we have said so far
to hold that we do not have to bind thought-contents to phono-
logical representations: it can be said that we interpret our IS just
as we interpret OS, i.e., by means of the linguistic-plus-pragmatic
system. It is also compatible with the view to have it that, although
we sometimes use IS in certain activities where conscious thought
is involved, conscious thinking is possible without IS. That is,
the spirit of the activity view is consistent with a general model
of conscious thinking which has it that conscious thinking is
typically unsymbolized: sometimes we speak to ourselves as an
aid—but in that case we cannot be said to be thinking in IS, and
sometimes we engage in conscious thinking directly (for a sketch
of this view, see Jorba and Vicente, 2014).
Here we will pursue a different view according to which predic-
tions issued on the basis of high level intentions play a prominent
role both in binding contents into phonological representations
(or in making IS meaningful) and in explaining UT. On the one
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hand, we regard this proposal worth exploring because it seems to
be able to unify apparently different phenomena. On the other, it
is the only proposal that we can think of right now which could
explain the nature of UT and the sense of agency attached to it. In
all, we think it has more explanatory power than the view we have
just mentioned.
INNER SPEECH AS MEANINGFUL
As we said above, there is a distinction between meaningful IS
(involved in the panoply of functions we talked about in the
previous section) and meaningless IS (which we use, for instance,
in order to simply retain uninterpreted items). If one regards IS as
the strings of phonological representations generated by linguistic
productions systems, the consequence is that IS is not meaningful
per se. In other words, the distinction between meaningful and
meaningless instances of IS has to be accounted for in some addi-
tional mechanism, for instance, an attentional mechanism that
puts the focus either on the semantic or the phonetic information
of the representation—which, as we argued, poses an explanatory
problem. In contrast, the activity view regards meaningful and
meaningless IS as different kinds of actions. It is not the case that
a subject produces a certain phonological representation and then
puts it to different uses, or under different attentional processes.
Rather, the very production of the phonological representation
starts with different intentions that mobilize different sets of
representations, e.g., in the case of meaningless IS semantic repre-
sentations are simply not mobilized to begin with. In concordance
with this approach, we think that the notion of inner speech
proper corresponds only to its meaningful instances18.
Another related advantage is that, by insisting on the idea that
IS is inherently meaningful, the activity view easily avoids one
aspect of the binding problem we mentioned in Section “How
Thought-Contents are Available to Consciousness.” As we pointed
out above, it is not easy to see how something that represents
sounds may also (semantically) represent the world. So if we
individuate IS in terms of format properties, we have to explain
how content gets bound to it. In contrast, according to the view we
are proposing, IS proper is meaningful, and content is an integral
part of IS episodes—it does not appear as something “external”
that one somehow attaches to represented sounds. Moreover, we
are in a position to claim that the content of an IS episode is not
the content that phonological representations could eventually
encode, but the content that the subject intends to express. In
other words, the activity view agrees that in IS the content
eventually adopts a certain format, but the specific properties of
the format are secondary to explain the phenomenon.
This issue turns out to be particularly important when we
consider condensed or fragmentary IS: a linguistic fragment (say,
“the ball!”) can be used to express many different thoughts
(that I lost the ball, that you lost the ball, that we left the ball
at home. . .). Most utterances, if not all, can express different
thoughts, depending on the circumstances, but fragments are
especially ambiguous (Vicente and Martínez-Manrique, 2005,
18We are aware that one can find a variety of uses for the label “inner speech”
in the literature, and we do not mean to legislate the usage of the term. We just
want to lay the emphasis on the distinct sort of phenomena that meaningful
and meaningless instances are.
2008; Martínez-Manrique and Vicente, 2010). Now, how can we
say that the string of phonological representations that constitute
“the ball!” means, e.g., that we left the ball at home? It only
conveys this specific content if we take into account not the
representations themselves but the intentions of the speaker. It
seems to us that this sort of response is not so easily available for
format views. In particular, the position we attributed to Prinz
above may have trouble in explaining how the intended content
(i.e., the content subjects want their words to have in a particular
occasion) gets bound into the phonological output.
BINDING AND THOUGHT CONSCIOUSNESS
There is another aspect to the binding question, however. In fact,
it is this other aspect that occupies Carruthers (see How Thought-
Contents are Available to Consciousness). Recall that Carruthers
resorts to binding in order to explain how thought-contents
become access conscious. His view is that thought-contents can
be bound into phonological representations and be broadcast
together with them. Carruthers, thus, is not so much concerned
with how phonological representations have meaning as with
how this meaning is broadcast and made available to higher-level
cognition. That is, Carruthers’s binding account is a response to
this latter issue. The question, then, is: can the activity view do
better than Carruthers’s version of the format view in this respect?
We want to argue that it can.
In motor imagery, as well as in motor acts, the brain issues
efference copies and predictions, which are used to monitor and
eventually correct actions on-line, as well as to confirm author-
ship (Jeannerod, 2006). It is not yet clear how the sense of agency
arises (see The Puzzle of Unsymbolized Thinking), but it seems
likely that it is linked to the good functioning of the forward-
models system of efference copies and predictions. Now, less is
known not only about so-called mental actions, but also about
how the system handles higher-level intentions. However, one can
claim that the system does not only receive efference copies from
motor commands and issue predictions about incoming sensory
signals; it also has to receive efference copies from higher-order
intentions and to make predictions on that basis (see Pacherie,
2008).
The architecture for the comparator system proposed by
Pacherie (2008) involves a hierarchy of intentions and predictions.
This allows her not only to explain how it is possible to monitor
the execution of higher-level intentions, but also to provide an
account of the different components of the sense of authorship.
Pacherie distinguishes three levels of intentions: distal, proximal,
and motor intentions (motor commands). Distal intentions are
about the goal of the action; proximal intentions are about the
here-and-now execution of the distal intention; and motor inten-
tions are about the movements of the body that will eventually
realize the proximal intention. As she says, each kind of intention
deals with a particular type of representation: “The contents rep-
resented at the level of D-intentions as well as the format in which
these contents are represented and the computational processes
that operate on them are obviously rather different from the
contents, representational formats and computational processes
operating at the level of M-intentions” (Pacherie, 2008, p. 192).
According to her, distal (D) intentions work with propositional/
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conceptual representations; proximal (P) intentions with a mix-
ture of conceptual and perceptual representations; and motor (M)
intentions with analog-format representations.
We do not want commit to the specifics of Pacherie’s proposal,
but we think that her points about (i) the different levels at
which the comparator system works, and (ii) the different kinds
of representations accessed at each level, are both sensible points.
It is at least sensible to think that a monitoring system such
as the comparator system has to allow for multiple levels of
control. Subjects have to track not only how motor commands
are executed, but also whether the intentions that triggered such
motor commands are being realized as expected and predicted.
Now, we can apply this kind of model to speech generation in
general, where the action of speaking begins with an intention
(which would be the D-intention) to express a certain thought
and culminates with the production of a string of sounds. Speech-
related intentions at the different levels generate predictions via
the forward model system, which are used to check whether the
speech action is being properly realized.
A hypothesis suggests itself at this point: the predictions linked
to prior intentions may be made conscious in the same way
that we can presumably make conscious the predictions linked
to motor commands. Unless we accept a ban on making non-
sensory predictions conscious, there is apparently no reason to
suppose that we could not make this kind of prediction conscious.
Carruthers holds that predictions (sensory predictions, in his
case) are made conscious by focusing our attention on them. In
general, Carruthers (like Prinz, 2012) believes that consciousness
requires attention. There are other hypotheses, though. Jeannerod
(1995), for instance, claimed that predictions are conscious just
by being predictions of aborted actions, i.e., if an action is
aborted after the prediction is issued, the prediction will make
into consciousness. His argument is that, when a motor command
is aborted, “the motor memories are not or incompletely erased,
and the representational levels are kept activated: this persisting
activation would thus be the substrate for (conscious) motor
images” (Jeannerod, 1995, p. 1429). In any case, our suggestion
is that the mechanism that makes sensory predictions conscious
may also work for non-sensory predictions.
If this were true, then we may claim that what is made
conscious in IS is not just phonological representations, but
also their meaning. The prior intention in an act of speaking
consists in intending to express a certain thought-content. The
prediction corresponding to this kind of intention is the semantic
content of the utterance: what we predict, and what we monitor,
is that a certain thought-content is expressed. If we were able to
broadcast this prediction along with the sensory prediction (i.e.,
the phonological representations), there would be no need for a
further binding of contents into sensory predictions. This seems
to be allowed by a theory such as that sketched by Jeannerod
(1995), where predictions are conscious by default, but it is more
problematic if we follow Carruthers’s idea that consciousness
requires attention. The trouble in this case is that to be conscious
of meaningful IS we would need to attend to two kinds of
predictions simultaneously: a prediction about a content, and a
prediction about some sounds. In our discussion of Prinz’s view in
Section “How Thought-Contents are Available to Consciousness,”
we argued that this kind of scenario is not feasible. Yet, we suggest
that it is possible to direct our attention not to this or to that
particular prediction, but to the outputs of the forward systems
(i.e., what the forward systems deliver) considered as a whole.
After all, the predictions corresponding to the different layers of
intentions are simultaneously active, given that all of them are
used in monitoring both the eventual incoming signal and the
predictions lower in the hierarchy. This means that the outputs
of the forward systems—the cascade of predictions of different
levels—form a close network or integrated whole19.
THE RELATION BETWEEN INNER SPEECH AND UNSYMBOLIZED
THINKING
The explanation we just have just outlined has the interesting
consequence of allowing us to think about UT in terms of IS
without collapsing the former into the latter. In contrast with
the format view, the activity view can easily accommodate UT,
as this view does not require that a certain format be used
for thinking consciously (see Jorba and Vicente, 2014). This is
another advantage of the activity view, namely, that by seeing
IS as, simply, internal speech, it is not committed to any claim
concerning whether or not conscious thinking and phenomenol-
ogy are possible without a perceptual/sensory medium. However,
here we want to move a step further and propose a speculative,
though we think plausible, explanation of what UT may be which
makes it continuous with IS and begins to account for why we
feel authorship with respect to our conscious, but unsymbolized,
thoughts (like the judgment that my friend is driving a car).
We just said that it is reasonable to think that the forward
system also generates predictions about the likely contents of an
utterance. Maybe, we have speculated, this kind of prediction can
also be made conscious. Suppose now that we abort a speech
action before orders go downstream to motor commands. Then
we might get a broadcast prediction about the content of the
utterance, which would be experienced as a thought (since it
is composed by conceptual/meaning representations). Moreover,
there is some chance that it would be experienced as an action
because it engages the forward system. At least, minimally, an
unsymbolized thought under this construal would feel as initiated
(will have the feeling of initiation), as there is an intention in its
etiology—which, plausibly, would not be there if we construe UT
as simply thoughts (apparently, a thought is not produced by the
intention to have it). But it is possible to hold that it would be felt
also as authored. As we explained in Section “Is Inner Speech a
Prediction?”, it is typically said that the sense of agency requires
successful comparisons, usually between sensory predictions and
sensory signals. But perhaps the comparison between a goal state
and a high-level prediction is enough to generate a feeling of
agency. Even if not much is known about how the sense of agency
is generated in the mental realm (Frith, 2012), we think the
possibility that mental agency is related to comparing high level
“products” is worth considering.
19One might contend that Prinz’s account can resort to this suggestion,
i.e., people may attend to both the acoustic and semantic properties of a
sensory representation. However, this suggestion does not help Prinz to avoid
our criticism of a regress, giving his commitment to accompanying sensory
representations.
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If we conceded this view, UT would appear as closely related
to IS20. We think that this fits nicely the phenomenological
characterizations of people reporting UT, in which the subjects
have no problems in giving a precise verbal, propositional charac-
terization of what they were thinking yet resist the suggestion that
they were experiencing those contents verbally. This easiness of
propositional report makes sense if UT is roughly the beginning
of a speech act that never became verbally realized. Moreover, the
account also advocates a continuity that goes from UT to private
speech. Taking into account Vygotsky-inspired approaches, it is
not advisable to separate private speech from what we usually
call IS, or even from UT, so we see this as a further advantage
of our way of looking at IS. The difference between, say, typical
IS and muttering, or even private speech, is not a difference
in functionality: muttering serves the same general functions
as IS (motivation, focusing attention, self-evaluation, etc.). The
difference lies in that in typical IS we allegedly produce a pre-
diction about phonological acoustic representations whereas in
muttering and in private speech we produce actual sounds. In
muttering and private speech, besides, we engage articulation
more clearly. In contrast, according to our proposal, in UT we do
not even reach the phonological level. Vygotsky claimed that IS
is typically condensed with respect to outer speech, and that it is
possible for adults to push this condensation to its limit, being
able to think “in pure meanings” (see Fernyhough, 2004 for a
model of how condensation would proceed). The account here
presented would give flesh to this intuition, even though this point
of contact with Vygotsky should be regarded as a coincidence
(and there are many points of departure from the Vygotskyan
tradition: to begin with, UT would not be IS hyper-condensed,
but IS aborted before intentions get precise enough). Whether we
use one kind of IS, including UT, or the other may depend on
stress, the level of attention required, and so on, as Vygostkyans
have long claimed21.
CONCLUSION
We have distinguished two general approaches to the phe-
nomenon of IS: the format and the activity view. The format view,
20Following what we said in footnote 8, the hypothesis about how UT is
generated we are outlining would link it to the cultural line of development
by relating it to IS generation. Yet we do not mean to suggest that UT would
be impossible if not related to IS. The explanation we put forward about UT
could perhaps be extended to the use of any kind of imagery, although it is not
clear to us whether purely imagistic thinking can be propositional. Perhaps
our account would predict that non-linguistic creatures could not experience
UT, as it is usually characterized.
21Another interesting consequence of this view is related to something we
mentioned in Section “Is Inner Speech a Prediction?”. We said that we are
sensitive to mistakes in IS (Oppenheim, 2013), which is problematic for the
view that IS is a prediction. In our proposal, which contemplates several levels
of predictions and monitoring mechanisms, errors could be detected at the
level of motor predictions, especially when these, once they are conscious,
re-enter the system as inputs. A prediction cannot check itself, but a higher-
order prediction can monitor a low-level prediction and detect errors, even
more so, we suspect, if the low-level prediction is also treated as an input
for the system. We think that the problems we mentioned in that section
are motivated by focusing too narrowly on the motor part of the act of
speaking.
as endorsed by authors such as Jackendoff, Prinz, and Bermúdez,
among others, holds that in IS we recruit a certain format in
order to bring thoughts to consciousness. These authors, as well
as others who are not particularly interested in the cognitive
functions of IS, think about IS as a product, namely, the strings of
phonological representations we seem to experience when we talk
to ourselves. We have criticized this position on several grounds:
first, it has to deny the possibility of conscious UT; secondly,
it does not have a clear account as to how thought-contents
make it into access-consciousness; and thirdly, it has too narrow
a view about the uses of IS. The format view can be weakened
in some dimensions, but some problems remain. UT and the
agentive experience attached to it remain unexplained, and the
issue of how IS makes thoughts conscious is not improved.
On top of these general problems, the hypothesis, endorsed by
some authors, that IS-as-a-product is a prediction about sensory
stimuli, has problems of its own: it is difficult to explain how we
can discover errors in our IS if IS is a prediction, and this construal
of IS seems incompatible with the idea that alien voices and/or
thought insertion are misattributed IS: misattribution seems to
require comparison, and a prediction cannot be compared with
itself.
Our general diagnosis about the source of all these problems
is that supporters of the format view have a narrow focus on
issues such as what is constitutive of IS, what is its main function,
or what sort of process may be responsible for its production.
We have presented an alternative we have labeled “the activity
view,” which takes a more inclusive view on the IS phenomenon.
Describing IS as an activity, namely, speaking, amounts to saying
that IS is functionally continuous with overt, or outer, speech.
We do not recruit a format with some cognitive purpose, but we
speak to ourselves in most of the kinds of situations we speak
to other people (self-expression, motivation, attention-focusing,
behavior-control, having fun, making irrelevant comments. . .).
This description of what we do in IS suggests that we should think
about IS not merely as the output of the linguistic production
system, but as the whole action of speaking. Speaking is an action
that begins with a prior intention to express a certain thought
and plausibly finishes with the production of some sounds that
have a certain meaning. The typical IS is that kind of action,
except that sounds are not produced but simulated. Adopting
this more inclusive view on the phenomenon allows us to solve
the problems that affect the format view. First of all, thinking
about IS as simply speaking does not question the possibility
of UT. Secondly, the view has no problem with explaining the
conscious access to thought contents. As it allows that we can
think consciously without IS, it is compatible with the view
that IS is used only as an aid in some circumstances, lending
support to other cognitive functions (e.g., focusing attention in a
complex task), or prompting further cognitive resources. Finally,
the activity view is in good part motivated by the different uses of
IS we can discover.
However, in this paper we have explored other explanatory
possibilities for the activity view with several objectives in mind:
to be able to capture the intuitive idea that IS proper has meaning,
to explain how this meaning can be attached to, and made con-
scious together with, phonological representations, and to address
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two particularly intriguing problems: the nature of UT and the
sense of agency attached to it. The proposal we have presented
makes use of the characterization of IS as an action in order to
explain the binding problem, the nature of UT, and the sense
of agency related to conscious thinking. Concerning the binding
problem, we have suggested that individuating IS as an action,
which begins with a prior intention to express a certain thought,
makes it easier to explain how thought-contents are bound into
strings of phonological representations. Prior intentions result in
predictions about the content of a thought: if such predictions
can be made conscious, we have a conscious thought. If the
predictions are made conscious together with predictions about
phonological representations we have the typical IS (“the little
voice in the head”). If the predictions are made conscious alone
because the action is aborted very early on, then we have UT. The
feeling of agency in this latter case comes from being a cognitive
process that is intended, and, plausibly, monitored.
Finally, although we have not tackled the issue of thought
insertion in this paper, we think that this general approach is in
an overall better position to explain how thoughts may feel as
alien, in a way that is parallel to the detection of errors in IS.
Higher-level predictions are used to check the correctness of lower
level ones in order to monitor whether higher-level intentions
are properly realized. Mismatches may result in misattribution
and/or error detection. We regard this idea as material for further
research.
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